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This paper provides formal proofs of vertical integration results including not only the 
well-known double marginalization arguments but also results on an extension 
incorporating conditions of quality, efficiency and ‘make or buy’ decisions for 
potentially vertically integrating firms. Each of these results is illustrated with 
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  1VERTICAL INTEGRATION RESULTS AND APPLICATIONS 
TO THE REGULATION OF SUPERMARKET ACTIVITY 
 
1. Introduction  
This paper has two related purposes. Firstly we present new formalizations of profit 
maximizing and transaction cost related arguments for vertical integration and 
vertical coordination. Secondly, we will show how these formalizations can be useful 
by illustrating them with reference to coordination between supermarkets and their 
suppliers, together with associated issues concerning regulation by the UK 
Competition Commission. 
 
The key results are theorems which formally establish the otherwise well known 
result that collective profits of a firm and its supplier may be increased if actions are 
coordinated so that the supplier’s transfer price is set below that at which its product 
would have been supplied in the absence of coordination. A corollary is that, if profits 
are appropriately redistributed, both firm and subsidiary may gain by vertical 
integration or vertical coordination vis a vis maximizing their profits independently. 
Further theorems will extend these results to cases with costs potentially associated 
with increasing product quality and/or production efficiency.  All of these results will 
be illustrated using examples with reference to supply chains in the food industry and 
to supermarkets. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of literature on 
vertical integration and regulation in the food industry. In Section 3 a stylised model 
and associated theorems of vertical integration are established and illustrated by 
reference to the UK Competition Commission’s 2000 report on supermarkets. Section 
4 focuses on literatures concerning vertical coordination with specific reference to 
product quality and to control of production efficiency in supermarket supply chains. 
With that context in Section 5 models developed in Section 3 are extended to include 
quality as well as production efficiency issues in a “make or buy” formulation in that 
way modelling decisions between vertically coordinated production and externally 
sourced inputs to production. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Vertical Integration and Regulation in the Food Industry 
There is a substantial and well-known literature on the advantages and disadvantages 
of vertical integration. Authors on this topic include Spengler (1950), Arrow (1975), 
Grossman and Hart (1986), Perry (1989) and Baumol (2001). But, given that the 
emphasis here is on supermarkets and food supply chains, we concentrate on a more 
specialised literature to argue the potential advantages of vertical integration in the 
food sector. In that context Hirsch and Votaw (1952) state that power will naturally 
come with economic size of the firm and that a large supermarket has an advantage 
over the small independent grocery shop in that it can benefit from savings derived 
from large scale purchasing and savings resulting from the exercise of monopsony 
power. Others, including Etgar (1978), Perry (1989), Martin (1994) and Dobson and 
Waterson (1996), have argued more generally that supermarket firms integrate in 
order to obtain market power and monopoly position. They argue that market power, 
if exercised, can control prices in the produce markets, undercut retail prices so as to 
force out competitors, shift risk and price fluctuations to the producers, as well as 
giving power to dictate terms and conditions to suppliers and to integrate vertically 
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powerful retailers with market power has shifted the bargaining position from the 
manufacturers to the retailers.  
 
Clearly great size and power stemming from market control and the threat to 
competition and to suppliers may operate against the public interest and for that 
reason may qualify for investigation by the competition authorities. However, while 
market integration in general and market power stemming from vertical integration in 
particular may operate against the public interest, it has also long been argued that it 
may not do so. On this issue Spengler (1950) stated that vertical integration may be 
welfare enhancing and such cases should not be subject to the competition law. 
Comanor (1967) argued that vertical integration does not necessary lead to an 
expansion of market power, although it may have a major impact on concentration at 
specific stages of production. This is also consistent with Baumol (2001), who argued 
that the regulatory agencies have now recognised that coordination of prices can be 
desirable if the firms involved are vertically, rather than horizontally, related. The key 
point here is that vertical integration tends to increase output because double 
marginalisation is eliminated. In such cases a competition agency may have a more 
favourable view of vertical integration than of horizontal integration and tend to avoid 
interference in such joint ventures. 
 
Issues with reference to vertical integration were central to the work of the UK 
Competition Commission when it undertook a major investigation on the supply of 
groceries to UK supermarkets (See Competition Commission 2000). This involved a 
two-stage investigation, firstly to determine whether the major supermarket firms 
were earning excessive profits and secondly to determine the source of the profits and 
how the profits were being earned (op cit p.12). One area of concern was the nature of 
the relationship between supermarkets and their suppliers. Two aspects were 
identified regarding the trading relationship between the main parties (supermarket 
firms) and their suppliers. The first, with regard to buyers and buyer power, was 
examined in the context of:- 
 
…the extent to which the main parties are able to obtain lower prices 
from their suppliers as a result of their size and importance to the 
supplier’s business, as opposed to those justified by reduction in costs” 
(Competition Commission, Appendix 11.5, p.429).  
  
In this regard the Competition Commission noted that, since the two parties have 
differing objectives because suppliers seek higher prices while supermarkets want to 
buy at the lowest, tension might arise (p.230). In particular suppliers argued to the 
Competition Commission that the power of the supermarkets has the ability to drive 
down suppliers’ prices to uneconomic levels (p.67). In this context the buyer power 
of the multiples can be construed as stemming from a dominant position over 
suppliers and this is consistent with the findings of the Competition Commission that 
the supermarket firms are always in a dominant position compared to small suppliers 
(Appendix 11.2, p.392). In any case supermarkets are able to exercise buyer power 
since they also have considerable selling power. For example the four largest UK 
supermarket firms measured by shares of grocery sales in 1998/1999 controlled 71.2 
per cent, with Tesco having 24.6 per cent.   
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alleged practices of supermarket firms on their suppliers (op cit p.94), which were 
also the result of buyer power in the hands of the supermarkets, since without it the 
practices are unlikely to happen. The findings of the Competition Commission were 
that 30 of the practices identified adversely affected the competitiveness of suppliers 
and distorted competition (op cit p.6). The most common practice was requiring 
suppliers to make payments for better positioning and access to shelf space of their 
products within the stores or better known as slotting fees (p.102).  This resulted in an 
environment where promotional and other marketing costs were loaded on to 
suppliers. As a consequence of market power combined with expense-inducing 
practices of the supermarkets with reference to suppliers, it can be argued that, while 
the supermarket costs were reduced and their profits correspondingly increased, 
suppliers’ expenses increased due inter alia to payments to supermarkets associated 
with these buyer power related practices. This underlines the point that, if these firms 
are to be vertically integrated, the distribution of profits is likely to be a crucial issue 
and fundamentally so if both parties are to benefit from that integration.  
 
So far no explicit distinction has been made between vertical integration and vertical 
coordination. It is now useful to identify explicit differences of two kinds. The first 
kind refers to administrative processes by recognizing a distinction between control of 
supplies of intermediate commodities through ownership of a supplier and control of 
supplies of intermediate commodities from a supplier by contractual means short of 
complete ownership. A second kind of difference refers to the nature of the contract 
between two vertically related enterprises - in our case, more specifically, to the 
determinants of the price and quantity supplied in a context of vertically related 
processes. These two kinds of differences are central to developments in the next 
section in which we present stylised models of the relationship of a supplier to one or 
more supermarket firms. 
 
3. Some Formal Results on Vertical Integration   
Assume that a firm s has a concave production function xs=fs(Ls,Ks,ys), where xs is 
output, and Ls,Ks,ys are respectively quantities of labour, capital and intermediate 
inputs employed. If (inverse) demand is given by the function p(xs) and unit costs of 
labour, capital and intermediate inputs are given by w,r and p(ys) respectively, then 
the profit maximizing level of output and optimizing levels for the acquisition and use 
of inputs by a firm s can be found via the optimization: 
 
Max π1 =π1*= p(xs)xs - wLs- rKs  - p(ys)ys 
  st   xs = fs(Ls,Ks,ys)                    (I) 
         xs,Ls,Ks,ys≥0 
Notice that in (I) the way in which the intermediate goods price p(ys) is determined is 
not specified. At this level of abstraction it might correspond to the optimizing price 
for an independently profit maximizing subsidiary or it might correspond to the 
optimal transfer price stemming from an optimization over two stages of production 
by a vertically integrated firm. More subtly, it might correspond to a transfer price 
where prices and quantities are vertically coordinated between a firm and a supplier of 
intermediate inputs to it. These three kinds of possibilities are now considered via 
programmes (II) and (III) and associated developments. 
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1=fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1), where ys-1 is output, and Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1 are quantities of labour, 
capital and intermediate inputs employed for its production with unit costs w,r and cz 
respectively. Then the profit maximizing plan for a firm s-1 is given by:  
 
Max π2 =π2*=p(ys-1)ys-1- wLs-1-rKs-1 - czzs-1 
         st   ys-1 = fs(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1)                    (II) 
       ys-1, Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1≥0 
 
If firm s is the sole purchaser of output ys-1, so that ys=ys-1 and p(ys)=p(ys-1), an 
optimal solution to (II) is in turn consistent with the successive optimization by a firm 
via (I) and a supplier via (II) in the absence either of vertical integration or of vertical 
coordination.  
 
Next consider a situation in which firm s and its intermediate goods supplier, firm s-1, 
are vertically integrated for the (successive monopoly) case in which firm s acquires 
all of the output of firm s-1 so that ys=ys-1. In this case firm s can select its own price 
for inputs ys-1 from its upstream supplier s-1 and arrange production of xs and of ys-1 
to accord with the solution to an optimization over these two stages of production as 
follows: 
Max π3 =π3*=p(xs)xs - wLs-rKs - wLs-1-rKs-1 -czzs-1 
                     xs = fs(Ls,Ks,ys)                        (III) 
                     ys = fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1) 
 x s, L1, K1, ys, Ls-1, Ks-1, zs-1≥0 
Associating Lagrange multipliers λs,  λs-1  with the constraints of (III) the corresponding 
Lagrangean is:  
 
Max π3 =π3*= ps(xs)- wLs- rKs - wLs-1-rKs-1 -czzs-1 - λs[xs -fs(Ls,Ks,ys)]             
                - λs-1[ys -fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1)]         (III)* 
In this case the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are sufficient for a maximum where, in each of the 
relations (3.1)-(3.7), if the variables on the left hand side are positive, the associated 
equations hold with equality: 
xs ≥0         δπ3/δxs = p(xs) + xs δp/δxs - λs ≤ 0         (3.1)   
Ls≥0   δπ3/δLs = -w + λs δfs/δLs ≤0                        (3.2) 
Ks ≥0      δπ3/δKs = -r + λs δfs/δKs ≤0                        (3.3) 
ys ≥0   δπ3/δy = -λs-1 + λs δfs/δys ≤0                        (3.4) 
Ls-1 ≥0   δπ3/δLs-1 = -w + λs-1 δfs-1/δLs-1 ≤0               (3.5) 
Ks-1 ≥0   δπ3/δKs-1 = -r + λs-1 δfs-1/δKs-1 ≤0                (3.6) 
zs-1 ≥0                 δπ3/δz = -cz + λs-1 δfs-1/δz ≤0                         (3.7) 
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quantity xs>0, if at all, then to the point where the marginal revenue accruing from its 
production is equal to its marginal production cost, λs.  
 
If optimally xs>0 then necessarily Ls>0, Ks>0 and ys>0, since positive quantities of 
these three inputs are prerequisites for a positive output of xs. In turn positive levels 
of inputs Ls-1>0, Ks-1>0 and zs-1>0 are prerequisites for a positive level of output ys>0. 
Consequently, if optimally xs>0, all of conditions (3.1)-(3.7) must hold as equalities. 
In these circumstances (3.2)-(3.4) and (3.5)-(3.7) take on familiar interpretations 
according to which, at a profit maximizing optimum to (III), the value of marginal 
revenue product equates to marginal factor cost for each factor employed.    
 
Condition (3.4) is the key relation here since, via the quantities λs-1  and  λs, it 
interrelates the marginal cost of acquiring quantities ys-1  at supplier s-1 and the 
marginal cost of supplying quantities xs of output from supplier s. In this context 
therefore the quantity λs-1 is a transfer price for inputs ys which, by contrast with the 
given price p(ys) for inputs in (I), is necessarily optimally determined with reference 
to the overall problem (III).  In fact p(ys) in (I) will not be consistent with the overall 
optimization (III) unless  p(ys)=λs-1, where λs-1  is optimal in (III). This idea is 
formalized in Theorem I: 
 
THEOREM I 
If ys-1=ys the overall profit generated by maximizing via (III)* and establishing an 
optimally determined endogenous transfer price λs-1 is no less than profit generated via 
separate maximizations via (I) and (II) with an exogenous transfer price p(ys). i.e: 
                                                       π3 *≥ π1*+ π2*  
PROOF 
If ys-1=ys so that p(ys-1)=p(ys) then optimal solutions π1
*,π2
* to (I) and (II) together 
constitute a feasible but not necessarily an optimal solution π3* to (III).  
 
COROLLARY 1 
  There is potentially an advantage both to user s and to supplier s-1 if they vertically 
integrate their actions so as to maximize their collective profits.  
 
REMARK  
Vertical integration with ys-1=ys corresponds to a class of special cases where p(ys) in (I) 
and =p(ys-1) in (II) are each equal in value to the optimizing value of λs-1 in (III). 
 
Increases in collective profit generated via (III) vis a vis (I) and (II) do not guarantee 
increased profits at each stage of production s, s-1. In fact vertical coordination or 
integration to maximize overall profit via (III) will generally reduce profits generated 
at production stage s-1. This is because, if the overall maximum is such that 
π3*>π1*+π2*, then the transfer price λs-1 and quantity ys-1 are such that λs-1<p(ys-1)* 
and ys-1>ys-1*, where p(ys-1*) and ys-1* are optimal in (II). This result is established 
formally in Theorem 2: 
 
THEOREM 2 
With assumptions as in (I), (II) and (III), unless λs-1=p(ys-1*), where λs-1 is optimal in 
(III) and ys-1* is optimal in (II), the optimal solution to (III) is such that λs-1<p(ys-1*) 
and ys-1>ys-1*, where p(ys-1*) and ys-1* are optimal in (II). 
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  There are three possibilities  
•  λs-1=p(ys-1*).  In this case π3*=π1*+π2* and vertical integration/coordination 
would yield the same overall value as independent profit maximization at 
levels s and s-1. 
•  λs-1>p(ys-1*). In this case profits contributed at level s-1 are reduced vis a vis an 
optimum to (II) since p(ys-1)* is associated with a profit maximizing solution to 
(II). Under this condition, too, profit at level s must be reduced vis a vis and 
optimum to (I) since unit costs of inputs ys-1 are then increased vis a vis an 
optimal solution to (II), it follows that, if λs-1>p(ys-1*), that solution cannot be 
optimal in (III) 
•  λs-1<p(ys-1*). In this case profits contributed at level s-1 will again be decreased 
vis a vis an optimum to (II) since p(ys-1*) is associated with a profit 
maximizing solution to (II). But in this case the profit contribution at level s 
would be increased, since unit costs of inputs ys-1 are then decreased vis a vis 
an optimal solution to (II). 
It follows that a necessary condition for an increase in overall profit such that π3*> 
π1*+π2* is λs-1<p(ys-1*) and thence, by the concavity of p(ys-1*), that ys-1>ys-1*. 
 
COROLLARY 2 
Together Theorems 1 and 2 imply that in the successive monopoly case a firm s and a 
supplier s-1 will potentially both gain from vertical integration iff: a) the transfer price 
is reduced accordingly and; b) the firms’ shares π1**,π2** of the relatively increased 




Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollary 2 together imply that under successive monopoly a 
firm and its supplier vertically integrating in such a way as to increase overall profit 
will yield an outcome raising outputs, lowering prices and increasing profits at both 
stages of production iff  the relatively larger profit π3** is redistributed so that, 
π1**≥π1* and π2**≥π2*. It follows that, if areas under (inverse) demand curves are 
measures of consumer welfare and profits are measures of producer welfare, then 
vertical integration will be associated with improvements both in producers’ and in 
consumers’ welfare. [Since output is up and production functions are concave by 
assumption, employment and the marginal returns to workers will also increase - 
arguably suggesting a welfare increase there too.] 
 
REMARK 
With reference to monopoly and vertical integration/coordination and supermarkets, a 
key question is not whether lower prices are exploitative, but whether overall profits 
are redistributed in cases in which supermarkets set lower prices to their supplier. We 
have noted (in Section 2) that this is not so - at least in the UK, where the Competition 
Commission found evidence of cases in which suppliers were paying for access to shelf 
space at supermarkets rather than being paid in the form of a profit share for lowering 
prices of their supplies to those supermarkets.  
 
For simplicity in this section attention has been focussed so far on the single stage 
successive monopoly case via the assumption ys=ys-1. But these conditions are not 
fundamental to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 or their corollaries. Extensions to 
more general cases, including more than one stage with firms s,s-1,s-2 and also to 
non-successive monopoly conditions, can readily be obtained. As an illustrative 
example of the latter kind, consider a case in which a single upstream firm s-1 
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inputs LRs,KRs,yRs. Assuming that ΣxRs=xs and ΣyRs=ys-1, the collusive oligopolistic 
analogue of (III)* is then: 
      Max π4 = π4
* = ΣpRS(xRS)xRS-ΣwLRs-ΣrKRs-wLs-1-rKs-1-czzs-1+λs[xRs -fs(LRs,KRs,yRs)]     
                                 +λ s-1[ys - fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1 )]         (IV)* 
                                         +ϕ(ΣxRs-xs)+θ(ΣyRs-ys-1)  
 
This formulation (or variants which would stem from more specialized oligopolistic 
conjectures) leads to Kuhn Tucker conditions and associated optimal decision rules 
analogous to those associated with (III)* above - including the analogue of the 
transfer price related condition (3.4) which provided the key to Theorems 1 and 2 and 
associated interpretations with reference to vertical integration. [An example of a 
variant is a market sharing conjecture with firm Rs profit maximizing and all others 
accepting known shares of the total output xs. This could be modelled 
straightforwardly by attaching market-sharing conditions as additional constraints to 
(IV)*. This idea is developed in a more general context via (V) below.] Such 
extensions, in common with all of the other developments in this section, might be 
construed as open to interpretation as consistent either with reference to ownership 
related vertical integration, or with reference to non-ownership related vertical 
coordination. The level of abstraction of the models used to establish Theorems 1 and 
2 and their corollaries is such that the distinction between ownership and coordination 
has so far been moot. A firm might have such power over a subsidiary that it could 
impose a coordinating solution equivalent to that obtained via (III) without owning its 
supplier - i.e. without being vertically integrated.  
 
4. Vertical Integration, Product Quality and Transaction Cost   
In the previous two sections attention was focussed on vertical integration and 
successive monopoly and advantages stemming from the absence of double marginal-
isation. In practice however firms may seek to gain advantages of integration without 
ownership of their suppliers by merely undertaking vertical coordination. In the 
absence of transaction cost, of uncertainty and of technical inefficiency stemming 
from organizational structure this distinction is inconsequential. But, given any of 
those circumstances it potentially becomes crucial. 
 
A longstanding framework for vertical integration and vertical coordination 
arguments is that pioneered by Coase (1937) based on his market failure argument. 
The core idea is that the firm as the agent that will efficiently displace a market when 
the cost of using that market is higher than when the firm internalises that activity. In 
this context, in common with Coase, Williamson (1971) predicts that a firm will 
choose to integrate two vertically connected functions when the transaction costs of 
using the market mechanism are higher than when the decision is internalised within 
the two firms. In other words, firms will choose a method of establishing 
relationships based on a comparison of their net effect on the transaction cost.   
Williamson (1971 pp.114-122) further argues that complex transactions are not the 
kind that spot markets could handle most efficiently but require a closer relationship 
between a buyer and seller to accommodate the complexities. He suggests that 
transaction cost motivates the use of non-market arrangements to vertically co-
ordinate activities.   
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states that if there is a high level of uncertainty in the supply of up-stream goods, 
firms would be motivated to integrate, but if there is a low level of uncertainty, then 
spot markets become its preferable mode of transactions.  This is further supported by 
Carlton (1979) who argues that firms will integrate in order among other things to 
secure first mover advantage where there is uncertainty in the supply of inputs.  
 
With more specific reference to food supply chains, there are further and compelling 
motives for coordination, which include product quality, and production efficiency in 
addition to motives of reductions of transaction cost and of uncertainty. An empirical 
study on the food industries by Frank and Henderson (1992 p.941) suggests that 
transactional inefficiencies encountered in the industry promote increased utilization 
of non-market vertical arrangements. This analysis is of the Coasian type which 
identified four significant determinants of transaction cost, namely uncertainty, input 
supplier concentration, asset specificity and internalization cost. While for Frank and 
Henderson uncertainty is measured narrowly with reference to demand and to supply, 
for Hennessy (1996) uncertainty-related motives for vertical coordination include 
information asymmetry with regard to food quality and the cost of identifying quality. 
The uncertainty of quality as a result of information asymmetry was earlier recognised 
by Davies (1987). He found that, where the quality of the intermediate product from 
an upstream supplier is uncertain, it might be preferable for the user to integrate. 
While production characteristics of the food supply chain provide the main motives 
for vertical coordination, legislation concerning food safety and food quality in the 
food supply chains also contributes as a facilitating factor for vertical coordination 
(Ziggers and Trienekens 1999 and Fearne 1994).         
 
In reality given that the number of suppliers serving each supermarket firm is large, it 
is not possible for it to integrate all its suppliers. According to Martinez (2002), in 
general supplier-retailer trading relationships may take several forms. Retailers may 
buy from the spot or open market, they may contract purchase, or they may undertake 
complete vertical integration with suppliers. In a wider context of the food sector 
Ziggers and Trienekens (1999) state that, since the food industry involves successive 
stages and big differences in scale between farm and non-farm activity, vertical 
coordination may be more appropriate than complete vertical integration. On the other 
hand there are cases where a supermarket firm is supplied by a single wholesaler, 
which in turn is being supplied by numerous suppliers.   
 
Forces motivating coordination between supermarkets and their suppliers include not 
only the widely cited motive of transaction cost reduction but other reasons peculiar 
to the food industry. In that context the changing facet of consumer preferences and 
awareness towards food quality and safety issues and its relation to reasons for closer 
vertical coordination in some agriculture and food sectors has been explored by a 
number of authors. Martinez (2002) argues that two reasons, namely consumer 
preferences and health awareness in the food they consume, have led firms in the food 
industry to coordinate their activities. Underlining this: in certain food sectors and 
especially in the poultry, egg and pork industries, there has been a pronounced 
increase in vertical integration and contracting in recent years. (See Aust (1997), 
Kliebenstein and Lawrence (1995).)  In each of these industries spot markets have 
apparently became a less efficient means of coordinating production and processing. 
Aust states that one of the reasons why integration and contracting has overtaken spot 
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preferences of consumers in terms of quality and methods of production. Besides 
eliminating uncertainty of supply, quality uncertainty is also greatly reduced if firms 
in the supply chains are vertically coordinated.  
 
In the next section we will investigate issues of transaction costs, of quality and 
efficiency by making extensions to the models developed in Section 3. 
 
5. Quality, Efficiency and “Make or Buy” 
Model (III) can be expanded to include quality by including a quality variable q in the 
inverse demand function with δp(xs,q)/δq>0 by assumption (so that quality increases 
demand) together with a quality related cost relation Q(q), as in (V) below. This 
expanded representation also includes potentially efficiency and productivity 
enhancing resources g1,g2 and associated costs G1(g1),G2(g2) where by assumption 
δfs(Ls,Ks,ys,g1)/δg1>0 and δfs(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1,g2)/δg2>0. Finally “make or buy” decisions 
for intermediate inputs are included by means of the relations ys=y1+y2, where ys are 
acquisitions of intermediate inputs, y1 is “make” and y2 is “buy” at a unit cost c2.  
 
 Max  π5 =π5
* = p(xs,q)xs-wLs-rKs-wLs-1-rKs-1-czzs-1-c2y2-G1(g1)-G2(g2)-Q(q)      
               s.t.  ys = y1 + y2 
      x s = fs(Ls,Ks,ys ,g1)                           (V) 
 y 1 = fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1,g2) 
        xs, L1, K1, ys, Ls-1, Ks-1, zs-1≥0 
Elements of (V) could be used to make contact with literatures on advertising and on 
X-efficiency and associated managerial theories of the firm. For example the quality 
variable in the revenue relation is isomorphic with the advertising variable in 
Baumol’s seminal sales revenue maximization model with advertising (Baumol 
(1959), and the incorporation of potentially X-inefficiency reducing resources gi in 
the production functions and associated cost relations Gi(gi) is similar to that 
employed in Crew, Jones-Lee and Rowley (1971). But here the main focus is on 
another feature of this model, namely optimal rules yielding “make or buy” decisions 
and associated interpretations with reference to the choice between vertical 
integration or coordination with endogenously determined costs and quantities and 
supply from another source at a fixed unit cost c2. These rules follow from the 
conditions for an optimum to (V). To determine these associate variables θ,λs,λs-1 
with the constraints of (V) to obtain the Lagrangean (V)*: 
 
     Max π5 =π5*= ps(xs,q) xs-wLs- rKs-wLs-1-rKs-1-czzs-1-c2y2-G1(g1)-G2(g2)-Q(q)  
          -θ(ys-y1-y2)-λs[xs-fs(Ls,Ks,ys ,g1)]-λs-1[y1-fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1,g2)]         (V)* 
  Necessary conditions for a maximum to (V)* are:- 
                       δπ5/δxs = p(xs) + xs δp/δxs - λs ≤ 0            (5.1) 
     δπ5/δLs = -w + λs δfs/δLs ≤0                    (5.2) 
        δπ5/δKs = -r + λs δfs/δKs ≤0                             (5.3) 
     δπ5/δys = - θ + λs δfs/δys ≤0                            (5.4) 
  10     δπ5/δLs-1 = -w + λs-1 δfs-1/δLs-1 ≤0                   (5.5) 
     δπ5/δKs-1 = -r + λs-1 δfs-1/δKs-1 ≤0                    (5.6) 
                           δπ5/δz = -c + λs-1 δfs-1/δz ≤0                             (5.7) 
       δπ5/δq = xsδps(xs,q)/δq - δQ(q)/δq ≤0               (5.8) 
       δπ5/δy1 = θ - λs-1 ≤0       (5.9) 
       δπ5/δy2 = θ - c2 ≤0      (5.10) 
       δπ5/δg1 = - δG1(g1)/δg1 + λs δfs/δg1≤0                      (5.11) 
       δπ5/δg2 =- δG1(g1)/δg1 + λs δfs/δg1≤0                          (5.12) 
         
Interpretations of conditions (5.1)-(5.7) are analogous to those of (3.1)-(3.7) above, 
namely produce xs>0, if at all, then to the point where the marginal revenue accruing 
from its production is equal to its marginal production cost, λs and if optimally xs>0, 
then necessarily Ls>0, Ks>0 and ys>0, since positive quantities of these three inputs 
are prerequisites for a positive output of xs.  In turn, if optimally inputs ys are 
acquired from firm s-1, then positive levels of inputs Ls-1>0, Ks-1>0 and ys-1>0 are 
prerequisites for a positive level of output ys>0. It follows that, if optimally xs>0, all 
of conditions (5.1)-(5.7) must hold as equalities. In those circumstances in a manner 
similar to conditions (3.2)-(3.4) and (3.5)-(3.7), conditions (5.2)-(5.4) and (5.5)-(5.7) 
take on familiar interpretations according to which at a profit maximizing optimum to 
(V), marginal revenue product equates to marginal factor cost for each factor 
employed. 
 
A key difference between (III) and (V) is the incorporation of quality via the product 
quality variable q. Specifically condition (5.8) requires that for an optimum to (V) 
resources must be devoted to quality enhancements of demand to the point where the 
marginal demand related gain equates to the marginal cost of enhancing demand. 
Another key difference is that the quantity λs-1, rather than being simply a transfer 
price between a firm and a vertically integrated or coordinated supplier, is a transfer 
price conditional upon firm s-1 being a supplier to firm s. In that context the quantity 
θ takes on the interpretation of the marginal cost of acquiring intermediate inputs ys, 
from firm s-1 in quantities y1≥0 via (5.9), or from alternative sources in quantities 
y2≥0 via (5.10), or from both.  
 
In these ways conditions (5.9)-(5.10) relate to “make or buy “ decisions and require 
that intermediate inputs be acquired from the lowest cost source - be that from an 
integrated subsidiary via quantities y1>0, from a coordinated external source via 
quantities y2>0, or from an optimal mix of both of these two sources. Together with 
conditions (5.4) they require that, for an overall optimum to obtain, the following 
conditions must hold: 
 
                                   λs δfs/δys≤θ≤ min{λs-1,c2}                (5.13) 
We emphasise that, via (V), the quantity λs-1 is a transfer price for inputs ys, if those 
are produced by a subsidiary rather than being bought in. This last point underlines a 
key difference between implications of (III) and those of (V), namely the 
endogenization of the vertical coordination or integration decision vis a vis outside 
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transfer price under the integrated structure and c2 is the price via coordinated 
acquisition or outside purchase (spot market). Therefore the make or buy decision 
depends on the transfer price i.e. use y1if cheaper than y2, or vice versa. 
 
Finally conditions (5.11) and (5.12) require that efficiency enhancing resources be 
employed to the point where the marginal enhancement in value of production 
respectively by firm s and by firm s-1 equates to the marginal cost of securing that 
enhancement. 
 
Analogues of Theorems 1 and 2 and associated corollaries could easily be developed 
with reference to (V). They would demonstrate that, if it were profitable to secure 
supplies for output at level s from a supplier s-1, then it would generally be more 
profitable to do so by introducing vertical integration or vertical coordination 
mechanisms to secure a collectively profit maximizing transfer price λs-1. However, in 
distinction from the models associated with Theorems 1 and 2, the system (V) 
includes the possibility of buying inputs from an outside “buy” source as an 
alternative to their acquisition from producer s-1. This is a key point since this “buy” 
alternative ensures an upper bound on the transfer price λs-1. In that way it provides 
another form of potentially cost reducing and profit increasing coordinating 
mechanism. This point is established more formally by means of Theorem 3: 
 
THEOREM 3  
    With assumptions as in (V)* and if c2*≤ c2 and/or G1*(g1)≤G1(g1) and/or G2*(g2)≤G2(g2) 
     then: 
Max π5=π5*= ps(xs,q) xs - wLs- rKs - wLs-1-rKs-1 -czzs-1- c2y2- G1(g1) - G2(g2)- Q(q)  
               -θ(ys-y1-y2) -λs[xs - fs(Ls,Ks,ys ,g1)]-λs-1[y1 - fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1,g2)]         (V)* 
                                                                ≤ 
Max π5=π5*=ps(xs,q) xs - wLs- rKs - wLs-1-rKs-1 -czzs-1- c2*y2- G1* (g1) - G2* (g2)- Q(q)  
                -θ(ys-y1-y2)  -λs[xs - fs(Ls,Ks,ys ,g1)] - λs-1[y1 - fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1,g2)]         (V)** 
PROOF 
  Any solution to (V)* is a feasible but not necessarily an optimal solution to (V)**. 
 
COROLLARY 4 
An enterprise may cut its costs and increase its profits by buying intermediate inputs to 
production from outside vis a vis acquiring them from vertically coordinated or 
vertically integrated sources.  
COROLLARY 5 
An enterprise may cut its costs and increase its profits by introducing less costly 
methods of increasing productivity. 
 
COMMENTS 
• An interpretation of Corollary 4 is that the management of a firm may cut costs and 
increase profits by switching from a regime in which some or all intermediate inputs to 
production are sourced by means of vertical coordination or integration to one in which 
some or all of those inputs to production are sourced from outside those channels. 
• An interpretation of Corollary 5 is that increases in productivity and associated increases 
in profits might be achieved by a change in ownership and/or in management where that 
change is associated with lower cost means of achieving productivity.   
• The two preceding interpretations may be coincident and such that a change in 
management is associated both with a change in acquisition policy and with a change in 
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of Theorem 3 could also include change in one or more of the production functions with 
those changes being interpreted as changes in production expertise associated with profit 
seeking changes in ownership/management.] 
 
In practice, however, and surely in the context of food supply chains and activities of 
supermarkets, quality and efficiency are likely to be determined in a market with 
more than one supermarket. Also quality is likely to be a significant instrument of 
rivalry between these supermarkets. Accordingly consider a generalization of the 
model in (V) to include 1s,2s..Rs..Ns firms at level s with qualities qRs of each firm as 
arguments in the inverse demand functions of all of the others, as in (VI), where it is 
assumed, too, that the Ns firms will seek to maximize their collective profits.  
 
             Max π6 =π6*=Σ[pRS(xRs,q1s,.qRs,.qNs)xRs -ΣwLRs-ΣrKRs -wLs-1-rKs-1 -czzs-1- Σc2Rsy2Rs 
      - GRs(g1Rs)-G2(g2Rs)- QRs(qRs)] 
                                        s.t.  yRs = y1Rs + y2Rs                 (VI) 
                                           xRs = fRs(LRs,KRs,yRs,g1Rs)     
                                       ys-1 = fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1,g2Rs)          
                                                   Σy1Rs=ys-1  
    xRs, qRs, LRs, KRs, yRs, y1Rs, y2Rs, Ls-1, Ks-1, zs-1 g1Rs,g2Rs ≥0 
Associating Lagrange multipliers θRs, λs, µs-1,λs-1 with the constraints of (VI) first order 
conditions stemming from (VI) are similar to the single firm case considered via (V), 
but now firms potentially interact through perceived quality as well as price and 
thence cost and productive efficiency. In particular the analogue of condition (5.8) is 
given by (5.14) below and efficiency and productivity analogues of condition (5.13) 
for two representative firms 1s and 2s are given by (5.15a,b) below. 
                                         Ns 
              ∆π6/δqRs = Σxsδp(  )/δqVs - δQ(qRs)/δqRs≤0              (5.14) 
                                                 Vs=1s 
Condition (5.14) has the interpretation: expand resources on quality enhancement to 
the point where the marginal net revenue contribution of quality enhancement equates 
to the marginal cost of quality enhancement. [Note that some δp(  )/δqVs will be 
positive but soe may be negative. Informally, perceived increases in a product’s 
quality may increase or reduce demand for rivals’ products.]  
 
                                  λs δf1s( )/δy1s≤θ1s≤ min{λ1s-1,c21s }                (5.15a) 
                                  λs δf2s( )/δy2s≤θ2s≤ min{ λ2s-1,c22s }               (5.15b) 
It follows from (5.15a) and (5.15b) that costs of intermediate inputs may be such that 
min{λ1s-1 ,c21s}=λs-1 and min{λ2s-1,c22s}=c22s so that firm 1s optimally acquires inputs 
in a vertically integrated manner from firm s-1 and firm 2s acquires intermediate 
inputs wholly from outside sources. [This may be so even if c22s=c22s]. Other 
possibilities are that one or both firms optimally acquires a mix of inputs, some  from 
a vertically integrated source at optimally determined transfer prices λ1s-1, λ2s-1 and 
others from vertically coordinated outside sources at acquisition prices c21s,c22s. In 
any case conditions (5.15a,b) depend on relations f1s( ),f2s( ),fs-1( ) which in turn 
depend on the properties of the productivity enhancing inputs giRs and their costs. It 
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productivity enhancing inputs giRs were cheaper and their quality enhancement 
properties were greater. 
 
In fact it is unlikely that firms will choose simply to maximize collective profit as in 
(VI). This is not only because such a solution may leave the supplying firm s-1 worse 
off in the sense of Theorem 1, but also because such behaviour is likely to be 
relatively easily detectable by the regulatory authorities. With this perspective we 
consider a market sharing extensions of (VI) via Theorem 4 in which it is assumed 
that a market leader or group of leaders will maximize collective profits subject to the 
conditions that each will accept at most a market share γRsΣxRs. [Compare (IV) above.] 
 
THEOREM 4  
With assumptions as in (VI) together with the assumptions that each firm at stage s 
will accept at most a market share γRsΣxRs and that the firms seek to maximize their 
collective profits given those conditions, then: 
                                                π7*≤ π6* 
Where π6* is the optimal solution to problem (VI) and π7* is given by: 
                 Max π7 =π7*=ΣpRs(xRs,q1s,.qRs,.qNs)xRs -ΣwLRs-ΣrKRs -wLs-1-rKs-1 -czzs-1- Σc2Rsy2Rs 
       -GRs(g1Rs)-G2(g2Rs)- QRs(qRs) 
                                        s.t. yRs = y1Rs + y2Rs                 (VII) 
                                           xRs = fRs(LRs,KRs,yRs,g1Rs)     
                                       ys-1 = fs-1(Ls-1,Ks-1,zs-1,g2Rs)          
                                                   Σy1Rs=ys-1  
                                xRs≤γRsΣxRs 
 xRs, qRs, LRs, KRs, yRs, y1Rs, y2Rs, Ls-1, Ks-1, zs-1 g1Rs,g2Rs ≥0 
PROOF 
An optimal solution to (VI) is a feasible but not necessarily an optimal solution to (VII) 
 
Clearly the multi firm specification in (VII) will yield one class of multifirm solutions 
for a potentially vertically integrated market which is oligopolistic at stage of 
production s via conditions analogous to those of (VI) but now moderated by effects 
of the additional market sharing constraints xRs≤γRsΣxRs. Underlining the central 
themes of the paper, those optimality conditions will imply properties analogous to 
results both in Theorems 1 and 2 and their corollaries 1 and 2 and in Theorem 3 and 
corollaries 3 and 4. Specifically: via (VII) firms at level s in a supply chain may gain 
by collectively obtaining supplies from a potentially coordinated supplier, s-1, but 
that, if they do so, then that coordination will generally lead to a lowered transfer 
price for supplier and - in the absence of compensating profit transfers - to 
correspondingly reduced profits. And; via (VII) firms may gain vis a vis others 
among other things if they access to less costly outside sources of supply of 
intermediate inputs to production and/or if they have access to lower cost means of 
increasing productivity.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a proof and a number of formal generalizations of the well 
known double marginalization result to the effect that successive monopolists may 
each gain by vertically integrating their operations. These generalizations include 
market sharing and profit maximizing oligopoly cases. They also include make or buy 
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extensions which in turn yield criteria for more subtle kinds of decisions, namely 
decisions between vertically integrating and vertically coordinating elements of 
firms’ supply chains. 
 
Because of the strong current interest in regulatory issues in that industry, attention 
has been focussed here on supermarkets. But these results are clearly applicable to 
other industrial sectors too. 
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